India eyes bigger Middle East role as Hormuz, Red Sea threats put trade, energy security at risk
India has an opportunity to expand its diplomatic and security role in the Middle East by using its relationships with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and European partners to address growing maritime threats, strengthen regional cooperation and advance economic connectivity, according to an analysis by Irina Tsukerman, an American lawyer, geopolitical analyst and national security researcher based in New York.
The article argues that threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb directly affect India’s energy supplies, exports and trade with Europe. Disruptions force shipping companies to reroute vessels around Africa, increasing insurance costs and delivery times for Indian exporters.
Although Saudi Arabia can transport oil through its East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, insecurity in the Red Sea also threatens this alternative route. India could strengthen maritime intelligence-sharing with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, coordinate naval escorts when necessary and deploy its P-8I surveillance aircraft to monitor suspicious shipping movements.
Its existing naval presence in the western Indian Ocean and continued engagement with Tehran could also help protect Indian crews and cargo while addressing threats to commercial navigation. The analysis highlights India’s strategic advantage in maintaining close defence and intelligence cooperation with Israel while sustaining economic and diplomatic ties with Gulf countries and access to Iran through Chabahar.
These relationships could allow New Delhi to serve as an intermediary on regional security and Gaza-related discussions, while keeping economic and technological cooperation between Israel, Gulf states and European partners open.
On Gaza, the article argues that reconstruction cannot succeed without credible security arrangements, reliable funding and effective Palestinian institutions. India could use its longstanding engagement with Palestinians and its relationship with Israel to encourage practical security commitments, support independent reviews of educational programs and help establish safeguards against the diversion of reconstruction funds and materials.
The analysis also calls for closer scrutiny of reported contacts between Hamas and Pakistan-based militant organisations, including concerns over possible exchanges of operational expertise. It notes that the extent of any such cooperation remains unclear and requires further investigation.
On regional security, India could work with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to exchange intelligence on suspected weapons shipments, engage Iran directly over threats to shipping and cooperate with legitimate Yemeni authorities on port security. The article also highlights concerns over possible links between Houthi and Al-Shabaab networks across the Gulf of Aden.
The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) could also be revived through a more practical approach based on independently financed infrastructure projects with clear commercial demand.
India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could advance port and railway links, while Egypt could participate through Suez-related logistics and Mediterranean connections, and Bahrain could contribute financing and transport links. Israel could provide technology and logistics expertise through Indian-led partnerships, subject to the approval of participating Gulf governments.
The article concludes that India should prioritize maritime security arrangements protecting its crews and cargo, pursue commercially viable infrastructure projects and use its diplomatic relationships to encourage realistic commitments on Gaza. Such steps could strengthen India’s regional influence, improve trade connectivity, protect energy supplies and expand its role in discussions on Middle Eastern security.
