Administrative Court cancels Article 15 of e-platforms regulations in Talabat case
. . . cancels rules allowing closure, suspension and license revocation
The Administrative Court has ruled to cancel Article 15 of the regulations governing intermediate electronic platforms and applications for displaying, ordering and delivering products to consumers, finding that the provision exceeded the legal powers granted to the Minister of Commerce and Industry by creating administrative penalties without an explicit legislative basis.
The ruling was issued by the court headed by Counselor Mohammed Jassim Bahman in a lawsuit filed by Talabat Company, challenging Article 15 of the regulations attached to Ministerial Resolution No. 109/2026, issued by the Minister of Commerce and Industry on July 8, 2026.
The court ordered the administration to bear the expenses of the case and pay 10 dinars in legal fees, while rejecting the company’s other requests. In its ruling, the court said the Minister of Commerce and Industry has broad authority to regulate the manner in which services are provided, subject certain services to pricing controls and issue decisions necessary to implement the law.
However, that authority remains subject to the limits established by the legislator and does not extend to creating administrative penalties of a punitive nature without an explicit legal basis. The court explained that Decree Law No. 10 of 1979, concerning the supervision of trade in goods, services and crafts and the determination of prices for certain goods and services, specifically regulates penalties and identifies the authorities empowered to impose them.
It noted that the legislation establishes penalties for violations of decisions issued under its provisions and distributes jurisdiction over certain penalties between the judiciary and the administrative authorities. This jurisdiction, the court stressed, cannot be expanded or exceeded through administrative regulations.
The court found that Article 15 established an independent system of administrative penalties ranging from warnings to administrative closure, suspension of activity and temporary blocking, ultimately extending to license cancellation and permanent blocking.
According to the ruling, the provision therefore went beyond the authority granted by law to the Minister of Commerce and Industry and entered the area of punitive sanctions that the legislator had not authorized the minister to create. The court consequently found the article defective for lack of substantive jurisdiction.
The court also rejected the administration’s argument that the disputed penalties were supported by provisions in other legislation, including laws governing commercial licenses and consumer protection. It stressed that administrative jurisdiction cannot be presumed or derived by analogy from powers granted under other legislation governing different fields and circumstances.
Instead, the authority to impose a penalty must be established by a specific legislative provision covering the case in question and within the limits prescribed by law. The court further held that the gradation of penalties according to the seriousness or repetition of violations does not remedy the absence of legal jurisdiction.
It said that while penalties may be properly structured according to the nature and severity of violations, the authority to impose them must first be established by law. The court also examined the administration’s reliance on Decree-Law No. 10 of 2026 concerning the regulation of work in the digital commerce sector.
It noted that the decree-law was issued on February 22, 2026, and published in the Official Gazette on March 1, 2026. However, Article 45 stipulates that the legislation would take effect one month after the publication of its executive regulations in the Official Gazette.
As the implementing regulations had not been published by the date of the hearing, the court concluded that the decree-law had not yet entered into force when the disputed ministerial decision was issued and therefore could not serve as a legal basis for establishing the contested authority.
The court further stated that even if the decree-law were considered to be in force, it would not provide a basis for the penalty system established under Article 15. It explained that the legislation regulates blocking through a specific mechanism, granting the Violations Committee the authority to block a store for a period not exceeding 30 days and in accordance with rules set out in the executive regulations.
The court held that this provision could not be used to justify the introduction of broader penalties, including administrative closure, suspension of activity, license revocation and permanent blocking. The ruling therefore cancels Article 15 of the regulations, together with all resulting legal effects.
