Newspaper not guilty of insulting accused in Imam Sadiq Mosque bombing

• The Court of Cassation affirmed that freedom of thought and criticism is a constitutional right, with restrictions as exceptions that must not undermine it, and that publication must not violate public morals or personal dignity and lawful publication cannot be deemed defamation, slander, or insult.

“I want freedom of expression to thrive in journalism, which cannot exist without it; a degree of excess must be tolerated to ensure access to facts on public affairs.” With these words, the Court of Cassation upheld press freedom in its ruling, acquitting the newspaper of charges of insulting a defendant in the Imam Sadiq Mosque bombing case, Al Jarida newspaper reported.

In a landmark ruling upholding press and speech freedom, the Court of Cassation, led by Undersecretary Counselor Fouad Al-Zuweid, acquitted Al-Jarida of insulting one of the accused in the Imam Sadiq Mosque bombing case, affirming that criticism is permissible even if strongly worded.

The court emphasized that the constitutional principle is freedom of thought and expression, including the right to criticism, while restrictions are the exception and must not override or undermine this right. It clarified that permissible publication and criticism must not violate public morals or infringe on an individual’s dignity or personal freedom, as protected by the Constitution and the law. If publication and criticism remain within these boundaries, they do not constitute insult, defamation, or slander. The court also stressed that criticism should not be judged by isolating specific phrases from their broader context under excessively rigid standards.

The court stated that the article, published as part of coverage of the Imam Al-Sadiq Mosque bombing, cited security sources identifying ISIS as responsible and mentioning the appellant as the vehicle owner used in the attack. It ruled that this was based on official findings and a criminal judgment, did not constitute defamation or insult, and fell within legitimate journalistic work. The court also affirmed that publishing Ministry of Interior reports is lawful when serving the public interest.

Court sets limits on defamation claims

The court emphasized that the constitutional foundation of freedom of thought and expression includes the right to criticism, with restrictions being exceptions that cannot erase or undermine this fundamental right. Any limitations must be strictly confined to their intended scope. It further clarified that permissible publication and criticism must not violate public morals or infringe on the dignity and personal freedom of individuals as protected by the Constitution and the law.

If publication and criticism remain within these boundaries, those responsible cannot be held liable for defamation, slander, or insult. For publication or criticism to be deemed lawful, it must not cross into any of these offenses. The critic or publisher must use appropriate language, avoid sarcasm or ridicule, and refrain from using words that distort the intended message or create a harsher impression than necessary. As long as the public interest is served, criticism and publication should aim to constructively inform rather than destructively attack.

The court underscored that opinions expressed in publications or criticism must be evaluated in the context of the broader public interest. This includes exposing irregularities in public affairs, institutions, and national resources, ensuring that citizens remain informed about such matters. The public must always have the opportunity to discuss and uncover the truth about these issues. The constructive nature of criticism should not be assessed in isolation from its context, and rigid standards should not be applied to individual phrases without considering their overall intent.

Freedom of expression is essential in journalism, and a certain level of excess must be tolerated to ensure access to facts concerning public affairs. The court noted that while defamation and slander through newspaper publications can lead to liability, intent and carelessness must be considered. If a publication serves the public interest or benefit—even if the language is forceful or critical—it does not constitute a legal violation.

Finally, the court reaffirmed that determining whether statements are defamatory, slanderous, or insulting is within the jurisdiction of the trial court, which has the authority to interpret the facts of each case. The Court of Cassation does not interfere in such matters unless a legal misapplication occurs. This ruling reinforces the importance of freedom of expression while establishing clear guidelines on permissible criticism within the framework of public interest and legal responsibility.

Court cites evidence linking ISIS to Imam Sadiq Mosque bombing

The court continued in its ruling: The evidence from the lawsuit papers and documents shows that on May 29, 2015, the electronic newspaper published a personal photo of the appellant as part of its coverage of the Imam Sadiq Mosque bombing. The article stated that the terrorist group ISIS committed the crime and that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle used to transport the accused to the mosque, handing it over to him.

The court noted that the phrases and images in the published news were not the product of the publisher’s imagination, fabrication, or personal motives but were reported in the public interest, within the limits of freedom of opinion and expression, and aimed at informing the public about the attack on Kuwait. The report cited security services, which had determined the perpetrators’ roles, including that of the appellant as the vehicle’s owner. This was later confirmed by the criminal judgment in the case, which the appellant acknowledged.

Freedom of thought

The court explained that Articles 36 and 37 of the Constitution, along with Article 26 of Law No. 3 of 1961 on the issuance of the Press and Publication Law, establish that the constitutional foundation is freedom of thought and expression, including the right to criticism, while restrictions are exceptions that cannot erase or undermine this fundamental right. If a publication exceeds these limits, the person responsible may be held liable for defamation, slander, or insult, as applicable. However, if the purpose of the publication is to address a public issue and critique a party’s position in pursuit of the public interest, the publisher—despite using strong language or harsh criticism—remains within the bounds of permissible critique.

Thus, the essential elements of tort liability are not applicable to the respondents, as no wrongdoing was proven against them. The article in question did not harm the appellant.

“Criticism is a constitutional right, not subject to strict monitoring”

In its final ruling, the court stated: “For these reasons, the appeal is accepted procedurally but rejected substantively. The contested judgment is upheld, and the appellant is ordered to pay court costs, along with twenty dinars in legal fees.” Additionally, in Appeal No. 2736 of 2016 (Civil), the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the previous ruling, and imposed the same financial obligations on the appellant.

Court says publishing accused’s image is justified

The ruling confirmed that publishing the image of the accused does not constitute defamation, prejudice his dignity, or insult him, as it falls within the limits of journalistic work. Furthermore, the appeal cannot challenge the failure to submit a copy of the Ministry of Interior’s statement on the bombing case, as the appellant did not provide evidence of such a statement. The court emphasized that publishing news from the Ministry of Interior, including legitimate photographs, is permissible as long as it serves the public interest.

It further noted that, based on the documents submitted by the appellant before the Court of First Instance, the article in question consistently referenced official sources, with phrases such as “the Ministry of Interior announced” and “a security source informed,” indicating that the information was quoted from the ministry.

Additionally, the appellant’s name was mentioned in connection with a previously established criminal ruling, which confirmed that he was the owner of the vehicle used by the terrorist involved in the bombing. This negates any alleged wrongdoing by the respondents, thereby nullifying the elements of tort liability against them.

As a result, the appellant’s claim lacks a valid basis in both fact and law and is therefore rejected. Since the appealed judgment aligns with legal principles, it is upheld, and the current appeal is dismissed as unfounded.